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Abstract
In a recent attempt to account for the equity-premium puzzle within a representative-agent model,
Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000) relax the assumption of rational expectations and in its place
use the assumption of distorted beliefs. The author shows that the explanatory power of the
distorted beliefs model is due to an inconsistency in the model and that an attempt to remove this
inconsistency removes the model’s explanatory power. Using the theory of rational beliefs, the
author constructs a model in which the inconsistency is not present, compares its performance
with that of the distorted beliefs model, and gives a simple interpretation of the results obtained.
JEL classiﬁcation: D84, G12
Bank classiﬁcation: Economic models; Financial markets
Résumé
Dans une étude récente qui tente d’expliquer l’énigme de la prime de risque rattachée aux actions
dans le cadre d’un modèle à agent représentatif, Cecchetti, Lam et Mark (2000) écartent
l’hypothèse des anticipations rationnelles pour utiliser à sa place l’hypothèse de la distorsion des
croyances. L’auteur montre que le pouvoir explicatif du modèle de distorsion des croyances est dû
à une incohérence intrinsèque et que tenter de l’éliminer revient à supprimer le pouvoir explicatif
du modèle. Se fondant sur la théorie des croyances rationnelles, l’auteur construit un modèle qui,
lui, est cohérent, compare sa tenue avec celle du modèle de distorsion des croyances et donne une
interprétation simple des résultats obtenus.
Classiﬁcation JEL : D84, G12
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Modèles économiques; Marchés ﬁnanciers1. Introduction
ItiswellknownthatasimpleLucas-typerepresentative-agentmodelcannotaccountfor
the historically observed differences in returns on equity and bonds. The problem, orig-
inallyidentifiedbyMehraandPrescott (1985),
1 hasgeneratedmuchworkinattempting
to resolve what has become known as the ‘‘equity-premium puzzle.’’ As Kocherlakota
(1996) emphasizes in his survey of attempts to solve the problem, the relationship be-
tween the returns on stocks and bonds found in the data is in line with the predictions
of the asset-pricing theory. The puzzle refers to a failure of a particular type of model
to match the quantitative properties of the data.
Three main attempts have been made to resolve the equity-premium puzzle within
the Lucas-type representative-agent model:
2
² modifying the utility function,
² relaxing the assumption of market completeness, and
² introducing transactions costs.
After an extensive survey of these efforts, Kocherlakota concludes that the litera-
ture has offered only two plausible explanations of the equity-premium puzzle:
(i) unusually risk-averse investors, and
(ii) the presence of transactions costs.
1 Hereafter referred to as MP .
2 See Kocherlakota (1996) for references.
1The problem with the first explanation is that most researchers are unwilling to assume
the degrees of risk aversion necessary to explain the puzzle. Regarding the second
explanation, the presence of transactions costs is not in itself sufficient to explain the
puzzle: it turns out that the assumption of transactions cost asymmetries across markets
is necessary. In particular, one must assume that it is much more costly to participate
in the stock market than in the bond market. Since the evidence does not support the
cost differentials needed to explain the puzzle, Kocherlakota concludes that the equity
premium is still a puzzle.
A common characteristic of all attempts surveyed by Kocherlakota is that the as-
sumption of rational expectations (RE) is maintained. Since the properties of prices
depend, among other things, on the probability structure, it is natural to try to relax the
assumption that agents know the true data-generating process and that they use it in
their computations. Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000)
3 relax the assumption of RE and
introduce a degree of persistent irrationality into the model. In particular, they assume
that the agent’s probability beliefs systematically deviate from the true beliefs. CLM
show that the introduction of this form of irrationality, termed ‘‘distorted beliefs,’’ with
all other features of the original MP model remaining intact, can explain the equity-
premium puzzle.
This type of explanation is potentially problematic. Substitution of the assump-
tion of RE by distorted beliefs in the manner of CLM is based on an interpretation of
RE in behavioural terms. Although RE can be interpreted in this way, the emphasis on
behavioural interpretation tends to obscure the role of this assumption as a consistency
condition in the model. Relaxing the assumption of RE will, in general, result in incon-
3 Hereafter referred to as CLM.
2sistent models. To relax the assumption of RE is not simply a matter of replacing it with
an alternative behavioural assumption—an alternative equilibrium concept is required.
An alternative to RE is the theory of rational beliefs and the notion of a rational beliefs
equilibrium, introduced by Kurz (1994). Rationality of beliefs can be interpreted as a
weak consistency condition: although heterogeneity of beliefs is allowed, a priori re-
strictions are imposed on the set of admissible beliefs in a way that model consistency
is preserved.
In this paper, we demonstrate the consequences of using an inconsistent model
to explain the equity-premium puzzle. Inconsistently specified models are shown to
result in additional degrees of freedom, which increases their explanatory power to an
arbitrary degree. After the nature of the problem is demonstrated, the equity-premium
puzzleisexaminedinarepresentative-agentmodelinwhichrationalityofbeliefsisused
as a consistency condition. Rational beliefs are compared and contrasted with distorted
beliefs and some conclusions are drawn.
Inthe following presentation, CLM’s model is used as an illustration of thistype of
problem, although the issuesraisedmayberelevant tothewhole classof heterogeneous
beliefs models. Our results suggest that one should be wary of any model in which the
expectational assumptions are motivated by behavioural concerns, without an explicit
demonstration of the consistency of the resulting model.
This paper is organized as follows.
In section2, we introduce the ideas of microspace and macrospace and use these to
describe model consistency. These concepts are then applied to models with distorted
3beliefs and an example is given that illustrates the sources of these models’ explanatory
power. Ideas illustrated in this example are developed fully in the rest of the paper.
In section 3, three types of models are described: (i) the basic RE model used by
MP , (ii) a simplified version of the distorted beliefs model used by CLM, and (iii) a
representative-agent model with rational beliefs. The properties of these models are
analyzed, and their relationship to each other is explained. As will be shown, both the
distorted beliefs and rational beliefs models are derived by expanding the state space.
The differences between them lie in the types of restrictions imposed on the agent’s
beliefs.
Section 4 contains the simulation results. First, we reproduce the equity-premium
puzzle results in all three models. Some of CLM’s results are then replicated and the
sources of their model’s explanatory power are examined. This is followed by an inves-
tigationof therelationshipbetweendistortedandrational beliefsandaninvestigationof




since the properties of any model follow from the specification of the characteristics of
agents, thepropertiesof themodelmustberelatedtothosecharacteristics. Our focuson
theroleofexpectationsinmodelstranslatesintotheanalysisoftherelationshipbetween
the stochastic properties of the model and those of the agents. To formalize these ideas,
the economy is viewed as a stochastic dynamical system. A model is consistent if the
stochastic properties of the system depend on the stochastic properties of agents.
4The following definitions formalize the above intuition:
Microspace: A space in which individual k operates, characterized by observable
variables and private signals. Denote this space by Vk; 8k:






where, Qk is the individual probability measure and T is the shift operator.
Macrospace (aggregate space): Product space X = £kV k:






The question of model consistency is a question of the relationship between the
individual probability measure, Qk, and the probability measure, ¦, defined on the
macrospace.
4 Since the macrospace is a product space, it is clear that the properties
of ¦ must in some ways be related to the properties of Qk: One form of consistency
that can be used is to assume that Qk = ¦: This is known as the assumption of rational
expectations.
Definition A model is said to be inconsistent if Qk and ¦ are independent.
Amodel isinconsistent if it is specifiedin such a way that the propertiesof the true
probability measure, ¦, are unrelated to the properties of individual probability mea-
4 ¦ will be referred to as the true probability measure associated with the macrospace.
5sures. In representative-agent economies the problem is particularly apparent. Since
there is, in effect, only one agent there, the independence of Q and ¦ leaves us without
satisfactory answers to the following questions:
² Assuming that Qk is given, what is the origin of ¦? The use of Qk by agents will
not result in ¦:
² If ¦ is taken as a primitive, what is the origin of Qk?
If one interprets ¦ as summarizing the properties of the data, the above problems
can be restated as follows: a model is inconsistent if the properties of the data, repre-
sented by ¦, are not implied by, or are not related to, the properties of Qk.
Models with distorted beliefs as well as models with rational beliefs relax the as-
sumptionofstrong-formconsistency. Modelswithrationalbeliefsimposetherationality-
of-beliefs condition, which can be thought of as a weak-form consistency condition.
Models with distorted beliefs do not impose any consistency condition relating ¦ to
Qk:
2.1 Rationality of beliefs as a weak consistency condition
The idea behind the rationality-of-beliefs condition can be illustrated as follows.
5 The
economyisrepresentedas(X1;B (X1);¦;T):Anagenthasavailablesomedataand
forms a belief about ¦; denoted by Q. The agent’s view of the economy is summarized
by (X1;B (X1);Q;T):
5 See Kurz (1997), Introduction, for an excellent summary of the main ideas.
6A stochastic dynamical system is stable if the frequencies of finite-dimensional
events converge. The assumption of stability implies the existence of an empirical dis-
tribution function. Kurz (1994) proves the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Kurz 1994) (X1;B(X1);¦;T) is stable iff it is weakly asymptoti-
cally mean stationary.
Under the assumption of stability, it can be shown that there are unique stationary
measures, m¦ and mQ, associated with each of the above systems. The rationality-of-
beliefs condition requires that m¦ and mQ coincide.
Stability is a weaker requirement than stationarity.
6 If the system is stationary m¦
and ¦ will coincide, but more general possibilities are allowed. In particular, non-
stationarity is allowed. This implies that if the data are generated by a stable system,
agents, in learning the empirical distribution, will end up learning the stationary distri-
bution of the system. The rationality-of-beliefs condition requires that this distribution
coincide with m¦: By contrast, the assumption of rational expectations requires that
Q = ¦:
2.2 Model consistency and explanatory power
Regardingtheexplanatorypowerofinconsistentlyspecifiedmodels,itisclearthatwhen
Qk and ¦ are independent an additional degree of freedom exists in the model that can
be used to improve its explanatory power. Indeed, as the following example illustrates,
almost anything can be ‘‘explained’’ using these models.
6 The assumption of stability imposes restrictions on the time-heterogeneity of the process. Some re-
strictions on time-heterogeneityofthe stochastic process are necessaryto makean operational model that
can be used to draw inferences about the data.
7Example 1 In the representative-agent economy analyzed by MP , the individual opti-






















for bonds. ¯ is the subjective discount rate, ° is the risk-aversion parameter , ¼ij is the
transition probability to state j given state i; and gj is the growth rate of endowments











































and setting ¯ = 0:95; results in the following values for prices:
p
b
1 = 0:939; p
b
2 = 0:930; p
s
i = 19;i = 1;2:
















i are state-i returns on stocks and bonds, respectively, and ¹ ¼i is the
unconditional probability of state i: Under the assumption of rational expectations, the
prices are computed using © and ¹ ¼i is the unconditional state i probability implied by
©: In this example, the expected rate of return on stocks is approximately 7.16 per cent
7 The details of the model are described in section 3.
8 The choice of ° = 1 is for convenience only. The points made herein do not depend on the choice of
°: Section 4 contains the results for different values of °:
8and on bonds it is 7.03 per cent. This results in an equity premium of 0.13 per cent, as
opposed to 6-7 per cent observed in the data. This is the equity-premium puzzle.










Under this specification, leaving the other parameters unchanged, the following values
are obtained for the prices of stocks and bonds:
p
b
i = 0:9608; p
s
i = 19; i = 1;2:
These prices were computed using ©0: Computing the expected returns using ©0 gives
½b = 0:0408 and ½s = 0:0413; so that the equity premium is 0:05 per cent. The puzzle
remains.
Suppose that the expected returns are computed using © while the prices are still com-
puted using ©0: In this case, ½b = 0:0408 and ½s = 0:0716; which gives an equity
premium of 3.1 per cent, much closer to the one observed in the data.
The preceding example illustrates the way in which an inconsistently specified
model can be used to explain the equity-premium puzzle. By properly choosing ° and
©0, while computing the expected values using © one can obtain any result.
3. Models
In this section, three types of models are presented:
(i) Model 1—rational expectations (RE),
(ii) Model 2—distorted beliefs (DB), and
(iii) Model 3—rational beliefs (RB).
9 Again,thenumberschosenareforconvenienceonly. Section4containstheresultsforseveral choices
that differ from the one here.
9The first model is used by MP; the second is used by CLM. The only difference
between these models is in the assumptions imposed on the agent’s beliefs.
Let £(m); m = RE;RB;DB; denote the solution sets associated with these
models. One can then write
£(RE) ½ £(RB) ½ £(DB):
This relationship follows from the assumption about the agent’s beliefs that is used.
The assumption of RE is the most restrictive, since it amounts to assuming, as noted in
section 2, that the agent knows and uses the true probability distribution in computing
the expected values. In the RB model, beliefs are restricted in such a way that the long-
run properties of the data are reproduced. This assumption is less restrictive than the
assumption of RE, since it does not rely on the knowledge of the true data-generating
process but only on some of its characteristics. RE models are special cases of RB
models when RB are the same as RE.
The assumption of DB is the least restrictive, since none of the characteristics of
the true data-generating process are used to restrict the beliefs that the agent can hold.
Even if agents can learn the characteristics of the true data-generating process, they
ignore them. That is why they are called ‘‘irrational.’’
There is another way to view the models introduced above. As shown in sections
3.2and3.3, bothDBandRBmodelsare obtainedfromtheRE model bytheappropriate
expansion of the state space. Although the expansion of the state space is used in both
DB and RB models, the key difference is that in DB models no consistency condition
is specified, whereas in RB models it is present.
103.1 Representative-agent economy with rational expectations
The model used in this section corresponds to the models used by MP and CLM. It is
a representative-agent model of an exchange economy with a single consumption good
and endowment uncertainty. There are two assets in the model: a unit of stock, with
price ps; and a bond, with price pb. Both pay in units of the single consumption good.
The payoff of the stock varies across states, whereas bonds pay one unit in each state.
Since there is only one consumption good in the model, and bonds pay a fixed amount
in units of this consumption good in each state, it follows that the bond is a riskless
asset.
The structure of the model implies that the solution will take a rather special form:
since there isin effect onlyone agent in the model, there will be no trade in equilibrium,
so that it is optimal for the agents to consume the available endowment.
The evolution of the endowment is modelled by a Markov chain, specifying the











Á1 1 ¡ Á2
1 ¡ Á1 Á2
¸
; (1)
with Á1 = Á2: CLM use the same specification, except that Á1 6= Á2:
10
10 The differences in the specification of the endowment growth process are discussed in section 4.1.1.





From the first-order conditions, we get the following expressions for stock and






















asset prices, there will be two possible states of the world, h and l, with bond and stock
prices defined in each state. For convenience, assume that the state at each point is
selected by a signal S 2 f1;0g; where the evolution of S is described by (1). The link
between this formulation and the one in MP is established by defining
gj =
½
gh if S = 1
gl if S = 0 :





The price mapping is given by P : S ! R: The consequence of the fact that agents
know and use © is that ¼ij = Á;i = j; and ¼ij = 1¡Á;i 6= j: The knowledge of (d;Á)
makes it possible to compute the prices in different states.


































where Áij is the ijth element of ¡m:














































13where ¹ ¼i is the unconditional probability of state i; which exists under the assumption
of ergodicity and is represented by the normalized eigenvector associated with the unit
eigenvalue of matrix ¡m:
3.2 Representative-agent economy with distorted beliefs
The model used by CLM is identical in all respects to the model described in section
3.1, except in the specification of the sources and the nature of the uncertainty. The
key to CLM’s approach is to relax the assumption that agents know and use ©: The









Á1 1 ¡ Á2
1 ¡ Á1 Á2
¸
;
with Á1 6= Á2:
11 This is assumed to describe the true process that generated the data.
Agents do not believe that this is the true process, and they form their own be-
liefs about the transition probabilities and the endowment growth rates. Their decisions
depend on pseudo-signals, which will in turn affect prices. Prices will depend on the
state of these signals as well as on the state of the observables in the economy. Thus,
S = D £S in a representative-agent economy and the resulting prices are P : S ! R:
CLM assume that there are, apart from the signal S 2 f0;1g indicating the current
stateoftheeconomy,twotypesofpseudo-signalsinthemodel: Se 2 f1;¡1g;whichin-
fluences agents’ behaviour in expansions, and Sc 2 f1;¡1g; which influences agents’
behaviour if the economy is in recession. Each of these signals is assumed to follow a
11 The implications of the difference in specification of the endowment growth process are discussed in
section 4.1.1.
14two-state Markov chain with transition matrices of the form:
¡Se =




















i = 1 ¡ ~ Ái; i = s;c:
The joint transition matrix of the pseudo-signals is then
¡ec = ¡Se: ¤ ¡Sc =



















The representative agent’s belief about the true transition probabilities can be de-
scribed as follows
12:
~ ¼(Se) = ~ ¹~ ¼e + ~ ±eSe;
and
~ ¼(Sc) = ~ ¹~ ¼c ¡ ~ ±cSc:
12 Similar expressions are used to describe the beliefs about the endowment growth rates in different
states.
15This is used to define the following:
p0 = ~ ¹~ ¼e + ~ ±e; pp = ~ ¹~ ¼e ¡ ~ ±e;
q0 = ~ ¹~ ¼c ¡ ~ ±c; qq = ~ ¹~ ¼c ¡ ~ ±c:
The following two transition matrices characterize the agent’s subjective belief:
~ F1 =
·
p0 1 ¡ p0
pp 1 ¡ pp
¸
;
if the current state is expansionary, and
~ F2 =
·
1 ¡ q0 q0




for the matrix ~ P, specify the conditional probabilities used in the computations:




~ F1[1;:]: ¤ ¡ec[i;:] if S = 1; Se = 1;
~ F1[2;:]: ¤ ¡ec[i;:] if S = 1; Se = ¡1;
~ F2[1;:]: ¤ ¡ec[i;:] if S = 0; Sc = 1;
~ F2[2;:]: ¤ ¡ec[i;:] if S = 0;Sc = ¡1;
; (4)
where i = 1;:::;4; j = 1;:::;8:
In the ensuing discussion, two simplifying assumptions are made:
(i) there is only one pseudo-signal governing behaviour in both the contractionary and
expansionary states, and
(ii) the agent’s beliefs about the endowment growth rates are not distorted.
16Useoftheseassumptionsmakesthesimilarities(anddifferences)betweenthemod-
els with distorted beliefs and those with rational beliefs much more obvious without af-
fecting any of the findings related to the first moment of the equity-premium puzzle.
13
Indeed, CLM’s success in explaining the first moments of the puzzle does not depend
on the presence of asymmetries arising from two different signals, Se and Sc: We will
first replicate the results of CLM and then investigate the sources of successes in this
model.
Due to the fact that there is only one pseudo-signal in the model, the dimension of







The transition matrices used by agents are still ~ F1 and ~ F2: The pseudo-signal is, as
before, assumed to follow a two-state Markov process with the transition matrix
¡Sec =








= 1 ¡ ~ Á:
The selection criteria for probabilities used in computations of prices are the same
as in (4), once ¡Sec is substituted for ¡ec. Note that if ~ ±i = 0; i = e;c; ~ ¹~ ¼e = Á1; and
~ ¹~ ¼c = Á2; these matrices coincide with the true transition matrix, which is called the
stationary transition matrix ¡ (described in section 3.3).
13 The intuition behind the results is summarized in Example 1 of section 2.2.
17The prices in the model are computed from (2) and (3) using the distorted proba-














where ¹ ¼i represents the unconditional state probabilities associated with the true tran-
sition matrix that describes the behaviour of the economy. These results will be used in
the simulation work in section 3.3.
3.3 Representative-agent economy with rational beliefs
We follow the same strategy as above, expanding the state space by allowing the agents
to hold beliefs that may systematically differ from the beliefs implied by the data, while
imposing the rationality-of-beliefs condition.
To keep things simple, assume that at any time the agent can use one of two tran-
sition matrices, F 1 and F 2, to compute prices for the next period. The agent’s belief is





; k = 1;2: The elements of the sequence are se-
lectedbyasignal, st 2 Sp = f0;1g;withPrfst = 1g = ®:Assumethatalargenumber
of observations on variables of interest are available to the agent. Also assume that the
agent has learned the stationary measure associated with the, possibly non-stationary,
system (X;B (X);¦;T) that generated the data. Denote this stationary measure as
m¦: The rationality criterion then requires that the agent’s belief be consistent with this
stationary measure, so that mQ = m¦:
The state space is S = D £ Sp; where Sp is the space of signals that select the
transition matrix to be used at any point in time. Since it was assumed that there are








Prices will depend on the state of dividends as well as the state of the private signals.
The stationary transition matrix in this case is given by
14




a1® 1 ¡ a1®
a2® 1 ¡ a2®
¸
:
Here, ® = Pr(s = 1); s 2 S = f1;0g; and a = (a1;a2) is a vector of parameters that
allow for the possibility of asymmetries across states.
The rationality-of-beliefs condition requires that the selected matrices reproduce







®k = 1: (5)
Matrix F1 takes the following form
15:
2
6 6 6 6
4
Á¸1a1® Á¸1(1 ¡ a1®) (1 ¡ ¸1Á)a1® (1 ¡ ¸1Á)(1 ¡ a1®)
Á¸2a2® Á¸2(1 ¡ a2®) (1 ¡ ¸2Á)a2® (1 ¡ ¸2Á)(1 ¡ a2®)
(1 ¡ Á)¸3a1® (1 ¡ Á)¸3(1 ¡ a1®) (1 ¡ (1 ¡ Á))¸3a1® (1 ¡ (1 ¡ Á))¸3 (1 ¡ a1®)
(1 ¡ Á)¸4a2® (1 ¡ Á)¸4(1 ¡ a2®) (1 ¡ (1 ¡ Á))¸4a2® (1 ¡ (1 ¡ Á))¸4 (1 ¡ a2®)
3
7 7 7 7
5
:
14 The formulation ¡ = ¡c: ¤ A will be used when we want to compare the performance of the models
with distorted beliefs and with rational beliefs.
15 Matrix F2 is calculated using (5).
19Here, ¸ = (¸1;¸2;¸3;¸4)areparameters. Theseparametersrepresentproportional
revisions of state probabilitiesrelative tothe stationary measure represented by¡.
16 For
example, ¸ > 1 implies that the agent assigns greater probability to states 1 and 2 than
is assigned by the stationary measure ¡:





(i;j) if si = 1
F 2
(i;j) if si = 0 ; (6)
where Fk
(i;j) is the (i;j) element of F k;k = 1;2.
The prices in the model are computed using the probabilities specified above. The














where ¹ ¼i denotes the unconditional probabilities associated with the stationary transi-
tionmatrix¡:Thekeydifference betweenthese computationsandtheonesinthe model
with distorted beliefs is that these probabilities depend on the transition matrices used
by agents, whereas in the model with distorted beliefs there is no link between these
and the agent’s beliefs. Indeed, one may interpret the distortions in beliefs as system-
atic deviations of unconditional probabilities associated with the distorted beliefs from
the unconditional probabilities associated with the true transition matrix. There is no
such discrepancy in the model with rational beliefs. The rationality conditions speci-
fied above put restrictions on the unconditional state probabilities as well. In effect, the
16 In the experiments in section 4.5, we assume that ¸i = ¸j; 8i;j; and for simplicity refer to this




and the Equity-Premium Puzzle
4.1 Parameterization
4.1.1 Consumption (endowment) process
CLM’s specification of the endowment process differs from MP’s and this has signifi-
cant implications for the model performance.
Bothspecificationsassumethattheendowmentprocessfollowsatwo-stateMarkov
process with the transition matrix:
© =
·
Á1 1 ¡ Á1
1 ¡ Á2 Á2
¸
:
The difference is that in MP it is assumed that Á1 = Á2: The difference in specification
is due to the difference in the way the consumption growth process is identified. In MP ,
the growth rates and transition probabilities are chosen to match the following sample
properties of the U.S. consumption series:
² average growth rate of per capita consumption (¹ = 0:018),
² standard deviation of the growth rate of per capita consumption (± = 0:036), and
² first-order serial correlation of this growth rate (½ = ¡0:14).







1 + ¹ + ±







g1 = 1 + ¹ + ±; g2 = 1 + ¹ ¡ ±;
while the transition probabilities are
Á11 = Á22 = Á; Á12 = Á21 = 1 ¡ Á;







CLM, rather than selecting the transition probabilities indirectly, estimate them di-
rectly using a regime-switching model, and use these estimates in their specification of




















The values used by CLM differ considerably from those used by MP . For example,
inMP ,theunconditionalprobabilitiesofeachstateare0:5;theunconditionalprobability
of the good state in CLM is 0:96, and the probability of the bad state is only 4 per cent:
22Whereasinbothcasestheprobabilitiesofstayinginthebadstate, oncethere, arearound
0:5, the probability of staying in a good state, once there, in CLM, is more than twice
that for MP .
Taking into account the growth rates, in the CLM’s economy good states are mod-
erately good, although they dominate by far, whereas the bad states, while infrequent,
are quite bad, with a drop in the growth rate of over 6 per cent and a greater than
50 per cent chance of lasting for more than one period. In MP , the situation is quite dif-
ferent. Both states are equally likely and, once in either one of them, equally persistent,
with a higher probability of exiting the current state in the next period than staying in
it. The growth rates in the good state are over 5 per cent; in the bad state the decline is
by roughly 2 per cent. In summary, the MP economy is much more volatile. This will
be an important clue in interpreting the results.
To make the results of our experiments comparable to those of CLM, their specifi-
cation of the endowment process will be used.
4.1.2 Other parameters
MPrestrictthevalueoftherisk-aversionparameter, °, tobelessthan10. Thesubjective
discount rate is restricted to the range ¯ 2< 0;1 >. These restrictions are standard.
The values of the other parameters are given and discussed in sections 4.2 to 4.5.
234.2 Recovering the equity-premium puzzle
In the first set of experiments, we report the values of the risk-free rate and the equity
premium in the special case when both the DB model and the RB model coincide with
the MP model. This is accomplished by setting the parameters to the following values:
®1 = ®2 = 0:5;
ai = 1; i = 1;2;
¸ = 1;
g1 = 1:02251; g2 = 0:93215; Á1 = 0:978; Á2 = 0:516:
Inthiscase, the stationarymatrix, ¡, andthe matrixusedby CLMcoincide. Inaddition,
the parameters of the DB matrix have been set to the following values:
¹p = 0:978; ¹q = 0:516; ±p = ±q = 0:
This means that the agent in the DB model is using the stationary matrix, so that in this
special case the DB model reduces to the MP model. The results are given in Table 1.
T able 1: Equity Premiums with CLM Specification of Endowment Process
Cases ¯ ° ½b ½s ep
1 0:95 1 0:0719 0:0722 0:003
2 0:95 2 0:0913 0:0914 0:001
3 0:95 15 0:344 0:699 0:356
4 0:90 3 0:173 0:172 -0:001
24Theexpectedreturnsonbondsandstocksarerepresentedby½b and½s,respectively,
and ep is the implied equity premium. As the last column of the table shows, the equity
premium is below 0.5 per cent for low values of the risk-aversion parameter. As case 3
illustrates, the high values of the risk-aversion parameter move the equity premium in
the desired direction. For reasonable values of the risk-aversion parameter, the equity-
premium puzzle remains.
4.3 Equity-premium puzzle with distorted beliefs
In this section, we modify the probabilities in accordance with the CLM specification
and present the results of the experiments. The results are used to explain the source of
explanatory success of the model.
T able 2: Equity Premiums in the DB Model (expected returns computed using
true probabilities)
Cases ¹ p ¹ q ¯ °
1 0:5 0:2 0:933 1:831
2 0:5 0:4 0:918 2:371
3 0:6 0:2 0:923 3:159






Columns 2 to 5 of Table 2 give the parameter values. These values are taken
from CLM
17 and are the parameter values which, according to CLM, solve the equity-
premium puzzle nearly exactly, in the sense that the mean risk-free rate is around
2.5 per cent and the equity premium is around 5.5 per cent. ¹ p and ¹ q are the mean values
of subjective transitionprobabilities used byagentsingoodand badstates, respectively.
17 See CLM, Table 4.
25These are the ‘‘distorted probabilities’’ used by the agent; ¯ is the subjective discount
rate and ° represents the risk-aversion parameter.
The results in Table 2 indicate that the equity premium is roughly in the desired
range, according to CLM’s criteria. These results are obtained by the judicious choice
of parameters. It is important to emphasize that the above returns were calculated using
the correct probabilities associated with the transition matrix, ¡, whereas prices are
computed using the distorted probabilities.
What happens when distorted probabilities are used to compute expected returns?
Table 3 gives the results. Both prices and expected returns are computed using the same
set of probabilities.
T able 3: Equity Premiums in the DB Model (expected returns computed using
distorted probabilities)
Cases ¹ p ¹ q ¯ °
1 0:5 0:2 0:933 1:831
2 0:5 0:4 0:918 2:371
3 0:6 0:2 0:923 3:159







to the MP model: the difference in return is quite small. In order to increase it, we need
toincrease the value of the risk-aversionparameter. Changingthemethodof computing
the expected values has resulted in drastically deteriorated performance of the model.
These findings imply that the distortion of beliefs is not in itself sufficient to generate
thedifferencesinreturnsobserved. Thekeytotheexplanatorysuccessof theDBmodel
isinthewaytheexpectedvaluesarecomputed: whilepricesarecomputedusingtheDB
26matrices, the expected values are computed using the true transition matrix. This type
of problem was illustrated by the example in section 2. Note that the results in Tables
2 and 3 were obtained without any change in the parameter values of the model. In an
inconsistent model, one can obtain different results with the same parameter values.
4.4 Rational beliefs and distorted beliefs
The problems illustrated in section 4.3 arise because the DB model does not satisfy the
basic consistency criterion described in section 2. Rationality of beliefs is a weak-form
consistency condition that resolves this problem without the need to resort to rational
expectations. In this section, the relationship between distorted and rational beliefs is
examined in more detail.
Taking the parameters of the consumption process used by CLM as the description
of the true data-generating process, we determine the restrictions that the rationality
of beliefs imposes on the agent’s transition matrices. These restrictions will be used to
assesswhether thetransitionmatricesspecifiedbyCLMcouldsatisfytheRBcondition.
Let ¡c denote the true transition matrix that is computed using CLM’s parameters.
The rationality conditions then require that
®F1 + (1 ¡ ®)F2 = ¡c:




(i;j) if si = 1
F 2
(i;j) if si = 0 :
Since¼ij areusedtocomputeprices,andsinceCLMuse¡c tocomputeexpectedvalues,
the question is whether, given ¡c, the probabilities that correspond to CLM’s specifica-
27tion of distorted beliefs can be obtained. This will depend on the extent to which the
matrices F1 and F2 can deviate from ¡c.
The deviation is regulated by the value of the parameter ¸: The RB condition im-













(1 ¡ a1®)(1 ¡ Á1)
:
These and other restrictions follow from the requirement that the entries of matrices F1
and F2 satisfy the properties of transition probabilities. Which of these conditions will
be binding depends on the values of the parameters of the process. Given the specifica-






that the entries in the transition matrix will be non-negative.
With this information, the deviations of the transition probabilities in F1 and F2
from the stationary probabilities specified in ¡c can be determined. Given the large
value of Á1, the admissible range is quite narrow.





0:489 0:489 0:011 0:011
0:489 0:489 0:011 0:011
0:242 0:242 0:258 0:258




with the unconditional state probabilities (0:47826;0:47826;0:02174;0:02174): The
unconditional probability of the high-dividend state is 0:95652, or roughly 96 per cent,
which corresponds to CLM.
28The rationality conditions imply the following restrictions on the unconditional
probabilities:
a. Matrix F1:
(i) Pr(s = h) · 1; Pr(s = l) ¸ 0, when ¸ = 1:02249
(ii) Pr(s = h) ¸ 0:92; Pr(s = l) · 0:08, when ¸ = 0:978
b. Matrix F2:
(i) Pr(s = h) ¸ 0:91; Pr(s = l) · 0:08, when ¸ = 1:02249
(ii) Pr(s = h) · 1; Pr(s = l) ¸ 0, when ¸ = 0:978
These results indicate that any matrices satisfying the RB condition would imply
the unconditional state probabilities in the range (0:92;1) for the h state and (0;0:08)
for the l state. The unconditional state probabilities for the DB matrices are given in
Table 4. The matrices that solve the equity-premium puzzle in CLM are outside of this
range and therefore do not satisfy the rationality criteria.
18
T able 4: Unconditional State Probabilities (DB matrices)
Cases ¹ p ¹ q Pr(s = h) Pr(s = l)
1 0:5 0:2 0:62 0:38
2 0:5 0:4 0:55 0:45
3 0:6 0:2 0:67 0:33
4 0:7 0:1 0:75 0:25
18 Additional cases are given in CLM, Table 4. The unconditional probabilities for all cases are in the
range (0:2; 0:82) for state 1 and (0:25;0:75) for state 2.
294.5 Equity-premium puzzle with rational beliefs
In this section, we use the RB model presented in section 3.3 and report the magnitude
of the equity premium under CLM’s parameterization of the endowment process. The
results are reported for four different combinations of values of (¯;°):These are the
values used by CLM.
The belief matrices are characterized by parameters ¸;®; and a: ¸ regulatesthe de-
viationsfromthestationarymatrix¡:Setting¸ = 1meansthat agentsusethestationary
matrixinallperiods. Parameteraregulatescorrelationsofbeliefs;settingittoa = (1;1)
makes the beliefs uncorrelated. The value of ® regulates the proportion of times the
agent uses matrix F1 in computations of expected values. Setting ¸ = 1;a = (1;1),
and ® = 0:5 gives us the stationary RE model used by MP . The results of section 4.2
are applicable.
To determine whether the model can explain the puzzle, ¸ 6= 1 was chosen. In this
case, F1 6= F2; so that the agent will be using different matrices at different points in
time. Setting ¸ > 1 means that the agent is more optimistic relative to the stationary
measure. Setting ® > 0:5 means that the agent is optimistic more than half of the time.
For this experiment, ¸ was set at its maximal value of 1.02249. We then searched for a
combination of values of parameters (®;a) that would result in the riskless rate in the
desired range of around 2.5 per cent, and computed the rate of return on risky assets and
the implied equity premium. The results are given in Table 5.
The prices were computed using the probabilities selected according to (6), and
the expected returns were computed using (7). As stated earlier, the rationality con-
ditions guarantee that the stationary probabilities used to compute expected values are
30T able 5: Equity Premiums in RB Model (F1 6= F2)
Cases ¯ ° ® a ½b ½s ep
1 0:933 1:831 0:96 0:140 0:0254 0:0579 0:0325
2 0:918 2:371 0:96 0:122 0:0254 0:0513 0:0259
3 0:923 3:159 0:95 0:125 0:0254 0:0281 0:0027
4 0:930 4:691 0:93 0:076 0:0253 ¡0:013 ¡0:0383
implied by the transition matrices used as the agent’s belief. This means that there is no
inconsistency in the computations.
The results in Table 5 show that the agent’s use of transition matrices that differ
from the stationary transition matrix does make a difference in terms of the model’s
performance. The riskless rate is lowered to the acceptable region, and in three out of
four cases the equity premium increases. Using different transition matrices over time
increases the volatility of prices, and this increases the equity premium required. An-
other common characteristic of these cases is that, in all of them, the acceptable riskless
rate is obtained by setting ® close to 1. Recall that ® represents the probability of us-
ing the first transition matrix. Since ¸ > 1; the transition probabilities associated with
F1 are greater than the transition probabilities associated with the stationary transition
matrix. The agent displays optimism relative to the stationary transition matrix. High
values of ® indicate that the agent is using this matrix most of the time. This is what
one might expect given that, according to CLM’s parameterization, the unconditional
probability of the economy being in a good state is 0.956. Although the theory of ra-
tional beliefs allows the agent’s transition matrix to differ from the stationary measure,
the above results indicate that, given the nature of parameterization, the agent’s beliefs
cannot greatly differ from the stationary measure (implied by the maximum value of
31¸ = 1:02249), and that since the economy is most of the time in a good state, it does
not seem to be reasonable to be pessimistic most of the time. The reason the model is
not successful in explaining the equity-premium puzzle is simple: the parameterization
of the endowment process implies that there is not enough volatility in the data! The
RB condition then puts the restrictions on the set of admissible transition matrices that
can be used to model the agent’s belief. Since the rationality conditions require that the
properties of the data, as represented by the stationary transition matrix, be reproduced,
this will restrict the type of behaviour possible.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the problem of model consistency and the explana-
tory power of inconsistently specified models by examining a particular example that
appeared in the literature. We believe that the problems illustrated here are more gen-
eral and may apply to a variety of models in which the assumption of RE is replaced by
alternativesthat are more behaviourally plausible without demonstrating that the result-
ing model is consistent. These alternatives include, but are not limited to, various rules
of thumb postulated as substitutes for learning, as well as a variety of irrational ‘‘noise
trader’’ models.
WehaveinterpretedKurz’s(1994)rationality-of-beliefsconditionanddemonstrated
that it is a meaningful postulate whenthe assumption of rational expectations is deemed
unsatisfactory. Although the representative-agent model with rational beliefs cannot
generate the observed equity premium, it does provide the best-case scenario. Since the
rationality of beliefs is a weak consistency condition, the model shows, conditional on
theobserveddata, thebestwecandointermsofexplainingthepuzzlewithintheframe-
32work of a consistently specified representative-agent model that relies on changes in
beliefs. Theresultsreportedherein, inconjunctionwiththeresultssurveyedinKotcher-
lakota (1996), suggest that the way ahead most likely lies in consistently specified het-
erogeneous agent models, rather than modifications of the representative-agent model.
The results of Kurz and Motolese (2001) are encouraging in this respect.
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